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HOW WELL CAN TAYLOR RULES TRACK THE BEHAVIOR OF THE ECB? 
 
Abstract 
Taylor (1993) proposed a simple rule that drew attention of economists, scholars and central 
bankers due to its simplicity and outstanding description of Fed’s behavior in 1980s. Over time, 
different versions of Taylor Rules (TRs) emerged aiming to evaluate the conduct of monetary 
policy of US and other countries, including recently the Euro area. Attending to the fact that 
previous studies concerning the Euro area are limited by short-time span of data, in this 
dissertation we analyze the performance of TRs in tracking the behavior of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), through a simple forward-looking approach and relatively long span of data (which 
comprises the two more severe economic turmoil of XXI century so far). The results obtained 
confirm that TRs, in general, track the ECB behavior very closely, mainly due to the gradualism 
of the ECB monetary policy. However, during economic turbulence we verified some deviations 
from the rule. The small magnitude of our empirical results reminds us that TRs are rough 
simplification of a complex reality. 
 
JEL Classification: E52, E58  





QUAL A CAPACIDADE DAS REGRAS DE TAYLOR DE DESCREVER O 
COMPORTAMENTO DO BCE? 
Resumo 
Devido à sua simplicidade e excelente descrição da política monetária dos EUA entre os anos de 
1987 e 1992, a Regra de Taylor (RT) (1993) atraiu a atenção dos académicos, analistas e 
decisores de política monetária; e, ao longo do tempo, foram surgindo diferentes versões de 
regras de Taylor, sendo cada versão uma tentativa de as tornar num instrumento mais prático a 
ser usado na avaliação da política monetária dos EUA e de outros países, incluindo recentemente 
a área do Euro. Atendendo ao facto de que os estudos anteriores associados à área do Euro estão, 
de certa forma, limitados por poucos dados disponíveis, nesta dissertação, analisamos as RT 
tendo em conta uma base de dados relativamente mais abrangente (que engloba, até então, as 
duas turbulências económicas mais severas do século XXI). Através de uma abordagem forward-
looking, o objetivo é de verificar a capacidade das simples regras de Taylor em descrever as 
decisões de política monetária do Banco Central Europeu (BCE). Os resultados obtidos 
confirmam que as RT, no geral, fazem uma boa descrição da política monetária do BCE, 
principalmente devido ao ajuste gradual da política monetária. No entanto, face às turbulências 
económicas verificam-se desvios das RT. Além disso, a magnitude dos resultados estatísticos 
remete-nos para o facto de que as RT são uma simplificação de uma realidade muito complexa. 
Classificação JEL: E52, E58 
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 Most economic scholars consider that in the short-run, optimal monetary policy response 
to economic shocks should combine some sort of interest rate rules involving a certain level of 
discretion and set of inflation targets.  
 Proponents of simple interest rate rules argue that implementing monetary policy by 
means of rules provide low probability of time inconsistence problem and, consequently, of low 
inflation bias. Although simple rules cannot account completely for unexpected circumstances, 
they satisfy the need for transparency, adequate communication and robustness (e.g., Peersman 
and Smets, 1999; Orphanides, 2007). Furthermore, many foresight or rational expectation 
models require the presence of systematic (rule-like) behavior on the part of the central banks 
for the equilibrium rate to be found. 
 The most popular rule in the economic literature stems from Taylor (1993) in which the 
key interest rate set by the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is described as a linear combination of 
inflation and output gap. That is, a reaction function that describes how Fed should attain its 
two-fold mandates (i.e. control of inflation as well as the maintenance of low business cycle 
fluctuations).  
 Given the Taylor rule (TR) simplicity and its outstanding description of the behavior of 
the Fed funds rate during the 1987 and 1992 – a period of long expansions and short 
recessions – it rapidly drew attention of economists, analysts and central bankers. Over time, 
different versions of TR emerged in an attempt to make it a better and actualized tool for policy 
makers to evaluate the conduct of monetary policy of many central banks, including recently the 
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European Central Bank (ECB) (Asso et al, 2010, give detailed discussion on TR influence on 
the practice of central banking).  
 As responsible for conducting the monetary policy of the Euro area, the ECB has an 
overriding mandate – price stability over the medium term – that is not dual as suggested by the 
TRs framework. However, in line with the ECB Governing Council monetary policy strategy, 
built on an analytical framework which is based on two pillars - monetary and economic 
analysis (ECB, 2011, p.69) – one can find room for TRs in the first pillar strategy given that 
output gap measures are included in the set of leading indicators for future inflation. In addition, 
this stability-oriented monetary policy strategy causes the ECB to behave in a systematic 
manner; a feature that we expect TRs to be able to track.  
 Considering that previous studies on TRs for the Euro area were limited by short-time 
span of data available and also that there are few studies analyzing the impact of the recent 
economic turmoil in context of TRs, in this dissertation, we intend to contribute to the literature 
by dealing with: relatively long time span of data – a sample period that comprises the launch of 
the euro as single currency and  two major economic turbulence (subprime crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis); three different measures of output gap, in which we 
specially include the OECD’s composite leading indicator (CLI), given that it aims to reveal 
early signs of economic turning-points and move in the same direction as the business cycle. 
Through a simple forward-looking approach with a smoothing parameter we aim to assess the 
TRs’ performance in tracking the ECB monetary policy-making. To complete this assessment, 
we extended the rule by a set of additional variables. 
 The results found do not differ much from those already seen in the literature, as will be 
mentioned through the dissertation: simple TRs seem to track the ECB policy decision very 
3 
 
closely (which testifies in favor of ECB’s systematic behavior). The use of Hodrick-Prescott-
filtered industrial production output gap points to output gap or the overall economic 
performance as the main trigger of ECB’s intervention, while the use of annual growth in the 
industrial production index (and the CLI) as proxy for output gap point that ECB policy rate 
reacts not only to inflation but also to the output gap ( both results are perfectly in line with the 
ECB’s main objective of price stability as output gap measures serve as leading indicator of 
inflationary pressure ).  
 Another result confirmed in this dissertation is the fundamental rule of interest rate 
smoothing in enhancing the fit of the TR: the particularly high and robust value of the smoothed 
interest rate coefficient is consistent with the ECB’s cautious policy intervention and suggests 
that past interest rates are the main determinants of actual policy rates.  
 Nevertheless, the main advantage of TRs – simplicity – turns out to be their main 
weakness: TRs, in essence, capture the general course of a stability-oriented central bank such 
as the ECB, but leave out a wide range of information needed to backup a central bank’s 
decision. This may justify the small (inflation and output gap) coefficients responses obtained. 
In fact, TRs are rough simplification of a complex, but may be used as an additional informative 
indicator. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical background; section 3 develops the econometric model; section 4 reports the empirical 
results; section 5 draws conclusions. 
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II. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
 In this section we first present a brief background on TRs and then systematize the 
empirical results obtained from selected literature regarding the Bundesbank and the ECB. 
2.1 Background on Taylor Rules 
 The economic literature related to Taylor-like rules is considerably vast. The different 
Taylor rule specifications vary from theoretical to empirical perspectives regarding: backward- 
and/or forward-looking perspective; measures of inflation and output gap; policy rate proxy; 
estimation methods; instruments and additional explanatory variables chosen; type of data; 
geography; sample period; models (e.g., Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) and so on. 
Each line of research on TRs has been an attempt to make it a more actualized and operational 
tool.  
 Clearly a thorough survey on TRs literature is beyond the scope of this dissertation; 
hence, we modestly review the ones that contributed the most to the present analysis. 
 We start by Taylor (1993) which proposed a simple rule that states that Fed should set its 
short-term nominal interest rate (it) – federal funds rate – in response to the equilibrium real rate 
( r  ); inflation gap (πt - π  ) defined as the deviation of inflation (πt) from its target ( π  ); and 
output gap (xt = Yt - Yt*) defined as the deviation of real GDP (Yt) from its potential level (Yt*). 
The rule is depicted as follows:  
(1) it* - πt = r   + βπ (πt - π  ) + βxxt 
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Implicitly, the rule recommends central banks to match their policy rate to the nominal 
interest rate ( r  + πt) as inflation rate and output are at their respective long-run levels.  
  Taylor gave same emphasis to both inflation and output stabilization, by assuming that 
the betas of inflation (βπ) and output gap (βx) were equal to 0.5, which implies that Fed should 
raise the fed funds rate about 0.5 percent as inflation (or output) raises 1 percent above the target. 
Additionally, he assumed that the equilibrium real interest rate ( r  ) and inflation target ( π  ) 
are equal to 2 percent.  
           With these values attributed in Taylor (1993), the TR entails what is called “Taylor 
principle”, which assumes that βπ should be greater than a unit, implying that as inflation 
deviates from its target, nominal interest rates (it) should raise more than one-for-one 
(sufficiently) to cause an increase in the real rates ( r  ); where a βπ <1 would imply deficient 
policy response to rising inflation, tending to aggravate inflationary pressure. This principle also 
assumes that βx should be positive but not necessarily above a unit, meaning that in order to 
achieve a stabilizing impact on output, monetary policy should accommodate shocks from the 
supply side. Such principle is consistent with the properties of model-specific optimal and more 
complex policy rules and provides a mean to anchor inflation over time. Such principle becomes 
visible when Taylor reaction function is rearranged as follows: 
(2)    it* = 1.5 πt  + 0.5xt +  1    where xt =(Yt - Yt*) 
 
 Clarida et al (1998) proposed a forward-looking version of TRs in which it is claimed 
that by considering inflation and output forecasts it is possible to incorporate a broad array of 
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information taken into account in monetary policy decision-making. This version of TRs comes 
as  
(3) it* =  r  + βπ (﹝Etπt+n |Ω﹞ - π  ) + βx(Ext   |Ω)+ εt 
 where x denotes the measure of average output gap ((EYt   |Ω) - Yt*); E denotes the 
expectation term; πt+n stands for inflation rate at t+n; π  is a constant target inflation rate; (Ωt) is 
the set of information available to policy makers at the time of decision-making regarding the 
short-run interest rate, and εt   denotes the error term (assumed to be i.i.d). 
 Given the environment of pervasive uncertainty faced by policy makers, it has been 
argued that they rather follow the “Brainard conservatism” (see Brainard, 1967) and implement 
monetary policy in a rather cautious and sluggish fashion. Hence, partial interest rate adjustment 
is modeled as 
(4)  it = (1 – ρ)it
*
+ ρit-1  + υt   
    Where it* stands for target nominal interest rate; ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of 
smoothing of the interest rates; and υt denotes an exogenous random walk shock to the interest 
rate.  
 Adding this partial adjustments into the equation (3)
1
 and assuming that there are no 
systematic forecast errors we can re-write the reaction function in terms of realized variable as 
follows 
(5) it =  ( 1 – ρ) α + ( 1 – ρ) βπ(πt+n - π  ) + ( 1 – ρ)βx xt+n + ρit-1  + εt ;   
                                                          
1




       where rt* stands for target interest rate; α = ( r  - βπ π  ); xt+n stands for the  measure of  
average output gap and πt+n stands for inflation rate at time t+n; π  a constant target inflation 
rate; ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of smoothing of the interest rates; and εt  denotes the error 
term . 
          Nevertheless, Rudebusch (2002) contradicts interpretation of ρ as monetary policy inertia, 
suggesting that ρ could be interpreted as persistent shocks faced by central banks and that the 
distinction between partial adjustment and serially correlated shocks is not clear. Gerlach-
Kristen (2004) finds that ρ is mainly the result of omitted or unobserved variables, while Sauer 
and Strum (2007) advocate that it is an indication of a “too little and too late” policy rate 
response to changes in the economic outlook. Castelnuovo (2007) used modified models in first-
differences to assess Rudebusch (2002) claims (for the case of the Euro area). His results 
confirm the importance of the lagged interest rate, but do not rule out the influence of the 
serially correlated shocks when fitting simple Taylor-like rules.           
          Another contribution to the TRs literature is related to the application of large number of 
explanatory variables as inputs in the TR aiming at the identification of relevant macroeconomic 
variables to monetary policy decision-making. These variables (among many others) include: 
unemployment rate (e.g., Clarida et al, 2000), exchange rate (e.g., Molodtsova et al, 2011), 
annual growth in the monetary aggregate (e.g., Ullrich, 2003; Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004), 
asset prices (e.g., Cecchetti et al, 2000), interest rate spread (e.g., Dotsey, 1998; Belke and Klose 
(2010); financial condition or stability index composed by indicators such as fiscal indicators, 
stock valuations, private sector expectations, international commodity prices, credit quality, etc, 
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that capture the vulnerability of the financial market, resilience of the banking system and 
external and internal vulnerability (e.g., Albulescu, 2010;  Castro,  2011).  
 Concern regarding the stationarity of the variables is also an issue dealt with in the TRs 
literature. In some research papers, authors assume that relevant variables are stationary (e.g., 
Clarida et al. 2000), while in few other papers authors use variables in first differences (e.g., 
Orphanides, 2003) or implement techniques such as the error-correction, cointegration approach 
(e.g., Gelarch-Kristen, 2003; Ruth,  2007; Sauer and Strum,  2007) to avoid spurious results. 
          Other issues are associated with the use of real-time data instead of ex-post revised data. 
Orphanides (2001) emphasized the preeminence of using real-time data, the information 
available to central banks at the time they consider monetary policy decisions, in policy reaction 
functions. Many recent papers have been dealing with this issue; for instance, Gorter et al (2008) 
findings suggest that the ECB’s monetary policy is stabilizing when real time expected inflation 
and output are used as opposed to the use of ex-post revised data (see also Orphanides, 2004; 
Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2005; Belke and Klose, 2011 among others). However, Sauer and 
Strum (2007) suggest that real-time industrial production index data does not add much to the 
TR performance for the Euro area; in addition, Marcellino and Musso (2010) pointed out that 
real-time estimates of the Euro area output gap are associated with reasonable high degree of 
uncertainty and perform poorly as leading indicator for future inflation. 
 Given its simplicity and despite of its limitations (e.g., inability to assure that past 
mistakes will not be repeated (Orphanides, 2003)), over time Taylor-like rules became 
considered as a valuable guideline for policy makers (because TRs may enhance transparency 
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and monetary policy communication) and for the financial markets to evaluate the conduct of 
monetary policy of many central banks, including recently the European central bank (ECB).  
 As responsible for conducting the monetary policy of the Euro area, the ECB has an 
overriding mandate – price stability over the medium term (ECB, 2011, p.64) – that is not dual 
as suggested by the TRs framework. However, in line with the ECB Governing Council 
monetary policy strategy, built on an analytical framework based on two pillars – monetary and 
economic analysis (ECB, 2011, p.69) – one can find room for TRs, given that output gap 
measures are valuable leading indicators for future inflation. In this context, a number of 
researchers were motivated to examine the potential usefulness of TRs as an informal policy 
guide for the ECB. For instance, some studies focused in estimating Taylor-like rules for the 
“fictitious” ECB prior to 1999 when ECB was not yet in charge of the Euro area monetary 
policy (e.g., Peersman and Smets, 1999; Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000); Other studies estimate 
and compare the ECB monetary policy with a benchmark such as the Bundesbank (e.g., Faust et 
al, 2001), or the Federal Reserve System (Fed) (e.g., Ullrich, 2003), just to name a few.   
2.2 Overview of empirical results from selected literatures  
 This section presents in the Table I an overview of the empirical results of different 
Taylor rule estimations regarding the Bundesbank and the ECB from selected literature, most of 
them mentioned above.  
 We start by presenting TRs estimates for the Bundesbank attending to the fact that due to 
its outstanding anti-inflationary monetary policy performance, it became a benchmark of 
monetary policy for European countries. Consequently, ECB was designed to follow the 
Bundesbank policy-making preferences (in order to inherit some credibility since there was no 
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track record proving ECB’s reputation). Therefore, most studies on ECB monetary policy 
compare Bundesbank (and /or Fed’s) reaction functions to the hypothetical ECB prior to 1999 
and also to the actual ECB reaction functions.  
 A first look at the Table I shows that TRs produce a variety of results under different 
specifications and sample periods; some results are very similar while others seem discrepant. 
For instance, the inflation coefficient response, βπ, ranges from 6.62 to values very close to zero 
such as 0.08 or even negative ones. 
TABLE I: OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF TAYLOR RULE ESTIMATIONS REGARDING 














Study Type of rule Data
Sample 
period
α βπ βx ρ Estimators
Forward looking ex-post 1979:3–1993:12 3.14 1.31 0.25 0.91
(0.28) (0.09) (0.04) (0.01)
Forward looking ex-post 1979:1–1997:12 2.52 1.3 0.28 0.93
(0.32) (0.10) (0.05) (0.01)
Forward looking ex-post 1985:1–1998:12 2.85 1.31 0.18 0.91
(0.85) (0.35) (0.16) (0.03)
Forward looking ex-post 1980:1–1997:4 3.87 1.2 0.76 0.76
(0.44) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Forward looking ex-post 1990:1–1998:4 2.65 1.51 0.49 0.32
(0.39) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19)
Contemporaneous ex-post 1988:1–2002:2 1.23 2.73 1.44 0.88 NLS
(1.59) (0.55) (0.76) (0.04)
Ullrich (2003) Contemporaneous ex-post 1995:1–1998:12 1.97 1.25 0.29 0.23 TSLS
Contemporaneous ex-post 1997:1-2006:12 3.15 0.09 0.37 0.95
(0.40) (0.53) (0.24) (0.02)
Forward looking real-time 1997:1-2006:12 3.6 1.39 1.52 0.86
(0.15) (0.53) (0.22) (0.04)
Contemporaneous exp-post 1999:1-2003:10 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.90
Forward -looking 1999:1-2003:10 0.38 0.42 0.03 0.84
Contemporaneous exp-post 1999:1–2002:1 2.6 0.45 0.30 0.72 GMM
(0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)
Contemporaneous ex-post 1991:1-2003:10 4.81 -0.84 1.45 0.94 NLS
(2.82) (-0.89) (1.99) (25.50)
Forward looking real-time 1991:1-2003:10 -6.23 6.62 9.24 0.98 GMM
(-0.61) (0.90) (0.64) 35.57
Forward looking ex-post 1991:1-2003:10 -1.36 2.15 1.1 0.91
(1.10) (3.83) (3.22) (31.20) GMM
Ullrich (2003) Contemporaneous 1999:1–2002:8 2.96 0.25 0.63 0.19 TSLS
Contemporaneous ex-post 1999:1-2003:6 0.88 1.52 1.12 0.86
(0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01)
Contemporaneous real-time 1999:1-2003:6 2.86 0.61 2.14 0.99
(0.50) (0.06) (0.12) (0.01)
Forward looking ex-post 1999:1-2003:6 1.74 0.64 1.44 0.81
(0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01)
Contemporaneous ex-post 1999:1-2010:6 0.02 0.47 0.39 0.95
(0.19) (0.35) (0.21 (0.02
Contemporaneous real-time 1999:1-2010:6 1.48 -6.13 3.68 0.97
(1.29) (6.29) (3.31) (0.02)
Forward looking real-time 1999:1-2010:6 -0.49 0.14 1.28 0.97
(0.33) (0.51) (0.56) (0.02)

















Gorter et al(2008) NLS
Gerlach and 
Schnabel(2000)












Note: standard errors  in parentheses (when available); The contemporaneous TR refers to: rt =  ( 1 – ρ) α +( 1 – ρ) βπ πt+( 1 – ρ) 
βxxt + ρrt-1  + εt; Forward-looking  TR refers to: it =   ( 1 – ρ)( r  + βπ (﹝Etπt+n |Ωt﹞ - π  )) + βxxt+ ρit-1  + εt ,( xt = (EYt   |Ωt ) - 
Yt*); GMM stands for generalized method of moments; TSLS  stands for Two-Stage Least Squares; NLS stands for nonlinear 
least-squares; and the IV stands for instrumental variables estimator.  
 
 As for the output gap response coefficient, βx, the Table I shows that, in overall, it 
complies with the Taylor principle (βx >0), which may indicate that the ECB reacts to the 
economic activity to the extent it poses threats to price stability (possibility identified in the 
Economic analysis). 
 Also, it is evident that the coefficient responses regarding Bundesbank’s and the 
“fictitious” ECB’s monetary policy reveal small differences (probably because of the Germany’s 
economic importance and, consequently, large weight in the calculation of the fictitious ECB’s 
interest rate); both central bank’s reaction functions fulfill the Taylor principle (i.e., βπ >1, βx >0) 
and reflect a consistent anti-inflationary philosophy. 
 Next, we observe that, in general and independently of the specifications, we have 
positive and high degree of interest rate smoothing (ρ). This suggests that the ECB has engaged 
in interest-rate smoothing in its monetary policy and that actual short-term interest rate depends 
heavily on its past value, or decisions taken beforehand by the ECB Governing Council (fact 
which attest the important role of credibility in monetary policy). 
 Concerning the type of data, the use of real-time data seems to improve the ECB’s policy 
rate response to inflation gap (βπ) relative to the use of ex-post revised data. 
 This brief survey also suggests that according to the Taylor principle (i.e., βπ >1, βx >0), 
the actual ECB adopts a destabilizing policy regarding inflation and appears to give more 
emphasis to the output. However, given the ECB’s anti-inflation philosophy, this might be an 
indication that the ECB loosened policy to stabilized output while creating credibility to anchor 
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inflation expectations, or TRs, more specifically, the Taylor principle is not in harmony with the 
reality of the actual ECB.  
 Interestingly and regardless of the criticisms undergone by the TRs, this kind of rule 
continues to be analyzed by researchers and economists over the years.  
III. Empirical Model 
 In this section we present the econometric model, the definition of the variables, the 
diagnosis of the data and introduce the estimator used. The regressions are based upon 
aggregated data of the Euro area (EA), not regarding the asymmetric nature of shocks affecting 
each member state of the EMU and the heterogeneity that exist among them (since single 
monetary policy is not able respond to country-specific shocks). STATA is the statistical 
software chosen to carry out our analysis. 
3.1 Model specification   
  We followed the type of Clarida et al (1999) reaction functions, without giving specific 
emphasis to the real interest rate, and estimated a simple TR model as depicted in the equation 
(6): 
(6) it =  α + βπ (πt+p- π  ) + βxxt+q + ρit-1 +εt   . 
    where it stands for the money market interest rate; α is a constant; p and q correspond to the 
time horizon for inflation and output gap expectations, respectively; πt+p - π  denotes the 
inflation gap – deviation of expected realized inflation (πt+p) at time t+p from its target ( π  ), 
which accordingly to the ECB definition of  price stability is set (below but close) to two percent 
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as assumed in the original TR; xt+q  represents the expected realized output gap at time t+q (p 
and q denotes time horizon for inflation and output gap which happens to be different); βπ and βx 
stands for the  interest rate response to inflation and  output gap respectively; ρ denotes the 
interest rate smoothing term; and εt  denotes the residual term.    
3.2 Data and variables  
 To deal with the short time span of data available for the  actual ECB, we considered the 
beginning of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and used monthly data 
covering the sample period 1994:01 to 2011:12. The estimations are carried out in levels and 
based upon ex-post revised data. In the Annex A1 all variables are explained in more detail, and 
in the Annex A2 we have the summary statistics. 
  As depicted in the eq. (6) the three main variables are: short-term nominal interest rate 
(it), inflation rate (π) and the output gap (xt). 
  In normal circumstances, short-term money market rates such as the Euro Overnight 
Index Average (EONIA) is very close to the main policy rate, namely the Main Refinancing 
Operation (MRO) – minimum bid rate. Besides, the data on ECB key interest rates is not 
available on monthly (or quarterly) frequency, which makes it difficult to use any of the key 
rates directly in the reaction function. Therefore, we deemed appropriate to use the EONIA as 
proxy for the policy rate, which is in line with most TRs empirical work concerning the Euro 
area (e.g., Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2005).  
 With regard to the inflation rate, it is measured by the year-over-year growth rate in the 
overall Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The inflation target is set according to 
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the definition of the Governing Council of the ECB, that is, bellow but close two percent over 
the medium term. 
 As for the output gap, we encounter two main issues: first, there is no monthly data 
available for real GDP; second, potential output is not observable. Therefore, we have to find 
proxies for both variables. 
 To deal with the lack of monthly real GDP data, some scholars implement linear 
interpolation methods such as Chow and Lin (1971) procedure to convert quarterly real GDP 
series into monthly series. However, attending to the fact that the Industrial Production (IP) 
index displays a strong co-movement with the GDP
2
, we don’t go through linear interpolation 
methods, but use annual growth rate in the overall IP as proxy for the annual growth rate in the 
real GDP instead.  
 To circumvent the potential output issue and get output gap measures, we took three 
different approaches, and hence started our analysis by using three different proxies for the 
output gap, which by definition fluctuate around zero mean:  
1)  The standard HP output gap: measured as the deviation of the logarithm of the annual 
growth of industrial production (IP) from its HP trend. Following e.g., Gerdesmeier and 
Roffia (2004) and Clarida et al (1998); we employed Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter – a 
mathematical technique used to separate the cyclical component of in output from the 
growth component – with the smoothing parameter set to 14.400 for monthly series to 
fit a trend to the IP index data (Annex  A1); 
                                                          
2
 See Annex B1  available on https://www.dropbox.com/s/lz9qtw0ha5n7t73/AnnexB.pdf 
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2) The IP output gap: measured by the annual growth of the index as proxy for the output 
gap (e.g., Fourçans and Vranceanu, 2004); 
3) The CLI output gap: The two aforementioned output gap proxies are standard in the 
literature. In addition to it, we found interesting to proxy output gap by the annual 
growth of the OECD composite leading indicator (CLI), considering that (though it 
gives more qualitative than quantitative indication) it comprises a number of selected 
macroeconomic indicators and aims to forecast cycles or turning-points in the reference 
series chosen as proxy for economic activity (in this case, the IP index) (Annex  A1). 
  We finalize our analysis by extending our baseline specification to consider the effect of 
other variables such as federal fund rate, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, exchange rates, 
annual growth of monetary aggregate (M3) gap on the augmented TR. We also included an 
interest rate spread variable and sovereign (Greek and Portuguese) risk premium (see Annex 
A1), attending to the fact that there is a significant issue regarding the role risk plays in 
departures of policy from the rule.   
3.3 Data diagnosis 
  At this stage we carry out the diagnosis of our time series with regard to the stationarity 
and endogeneity of the variables, the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error term. 
In addition, we check the multicollinearity effect on the model and, finally, determine the time 
horizon. 
 In order to check the stationarity, we employed the modified Dickey-Fuller test (DF-
GLS), which has the best overall performance in terms of small-sample size and power 
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compared to the ordinary Dickey-Fuller test; we complemented this test by employing the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS). The tests resulted that the short-term money 
market rate, inflation, and the growth rate in the IP index are nonstationary I (1) variables. The 
standard HP output gap is stationary I (0) by construction. The CLI as well as its annual growth 
rate are also stationary I (0). The stationarity test results are available in the annex (see Annex 
A3). 
 In fact, we found that the error term resulting from a linear combination between the 
variables is a stationary I (0) process. For this reason, the variables are cointegrated and hence, 
any regression relationship between those variables is non-spurious. Therefore we proceeded by 
using the variables in terms of level as opposed to first differences. 
 Regarding endogeneity, contrary to what is expected, the endogeneity test defined as the 
difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics (see Annex A4), failed to reject the null hypothesis, 
and hence, inflation gap as well as output gap could be treated as exogenous. 
 To test for heteroskedasticity, we used tests such as Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg (see 
Annex A5). Their rejection of the null hypothesis ascertains that the variance of the residuals is 
not constant over time. As result, the model is corrected to be robust to this fact. 
 The serial correlation test, Cumby-Huizinga test, failed to reject the null which states that 
there is no serial correlation (see Annex A6). This calls for feasibility of least square estimates 
and no need for model correction accounting for autocorrelation. 
The degree collinearity of the variables was tested through variance inflation factor 
(VIF), which results came out no greater than 10, implying that multicolinearity does not 
represent a problem to the model. Besides, STATA automatically removes the variables that 
present collinearity problem. 
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 Finally, we address the issue regarding the appropriate target horizon for both inflation 
(p) and output gap (q). There is no consensus about it, moreover, the ECB monetary strategy 
does not specify a fixed time horizon for policy stance, though it has a medium term (one to two 
years) target for inflation, inflation and economic activity forecasts over two to three years. The 
time horizon used here is not chosen randomly: after running several regressions with different 
horizons, the model was chosen based on link test (an option built into STATA) model 
specification, Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE), the Akaike’s (AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian 
(BIC) information criteria. The time horizons implemented in this exercise are, therefore: six-
month and three-month for inflation and output gap, respectively – which happens to reflects the 
“conventional wisdom” which shows that economic activity react faster to monetary policy 
decision than inflation does. When working with CLIs, no time lead is applied given that, 
conceptually, it is comparable to business cycle projections (see Annex A1) with short /medium 
term lead ranging between two to eight months. 
3.4 Estimator 
 In general, forward-looking models are based upon future realized economic variables 
which in turn are affected by past policy. This should imply the existence of endogeneity and the 
need to implement instrumental variable (IV) estimators. However, as it was seen above, 
endogeneity test showed that inflation and output may be treated as exogenous variables. In this 
case, apart from providing us with descriptive statistics and working well as benchmark 
estimator, the ordinary least square (OLS) would be consistent and unbiased. Nevertheless, we 
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(questioning the test results) opted to employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
3
even 
though in small-sample its performance may sometimes be poor requiring cautious 
interpretation of its estimates. 
 GMM estimator (as well as other IV estimators) is very sensitive to the choice of 
instrumental variables, which are to be orthogonal to error term and correlated with the 
endogenous variables. It is common to select the lags of inflation, output gap and other 
explanatory variables as potential instruments. Our instruments are set as follows: one-month 
lag of inflation, six- and twelve-month lags of the output gap (for both when it is measured by 
the standard HP output gap and by the annual growth rate of the IP index); one- and six month 
lag of inflation and three-month lag of output gap when proxied by CLIs. The j-test for over-
identifying restrictions approves the validity of our instruments. The results produced by 
Limited-Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), which is more robust to weak instruments, 
do not differ from those obtained from GMM, indicating that the instruments used are quite 
suitable.  
IV. Empirical results 
 In this section we present the econometric results. First, we show the results of the GMM 
estimator using the three measures of output gap for the whole sample. Then, we consider a 
sample period that begins with the launch of the euro (January, 1999). Next, we analyze the 
effect of changes in the economic structure on the course of the ECB policy. And finally, we 
extend the model to account for the impact of additional variables.  
                                                          
3
 GMM deals with over-identification and in case of  just identification it reduces to two stage least square (2SLS) 
19 
 
4.1 Baseline specification results  
The Table II reports the results of our baseline specification (eq. 6) estimated through 
GMM with three different measures of output gap. At first glance, one may notice that the 
results are very sensitive to output gap measures. The results obtained from the standard HP 
output gap contradict those from the annual growth of the IP index and the annual growth of the 
OECD composite leading indicator (CLI) (regardless of estimator used, see Annex A7).  
The use of standard HP output gap provides us with statistically insignificant policy rate 
response to inflation gap (or even a negative response under OLS, see Annex A7), and points to 
a prominent role of the output gap in the monetary transmission mechanism due to its strong 
influences on future inflation (e.g., economic growth acceleration triggers a hike in the inflation 
expectation) – as also pointed in Gerlach and Smets (1999).  
TABLE II: ESTIMATES OF TR IN THE EURO AREA: 1994:01-2011:12   
 Note:  










N 198 198 204
j-test 3.366 1.756 2.721
(p-value) (0.186) (0.416) (0.257)
AIC -135 -146 -116
BIC -121 -132 -103
RMSE 0.169 0.164 0.179






 HP output put gap %IP CLI 
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2. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
3. AIC and BIC stands for the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, respectively - the lower their value, the  better 
the model; RMSE stands for root mean square error which measures the dispersion in the error term;  
4. HP output put gap stands for the difference between the logarithm of the IP index and its Hodrick-Prescott-filtered 
trend; %IP stands for the annual growth rate of the Industrial production index, and CLI for the annual growth rate 
of the amplitude adjusted composite leading indicator (CLIs) of the OCDE (see Annex A1); 
5. The j-test stands for the Sargan-Hansen test, a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid instruments (uncorrelated with the error term). A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the 
instruments. 
 
Contrary, when the economic activity is measured by the annual growth rate of the IP 
index or by the annual growth rate of CLIs, the policy rate response to the output gap, though 
statistically different from zero, is reasonably small in magnitude. Also, in these two cases, 
inflation gap appears to gain statistical relevance. According to these results, the ECB not only 
adjust the policy rate in response to inflation but also to the economic activity (conclusion not 
very distinct from those of Fourçans & Vranceanu (2004)).  
The aforementioned observations support the ECB mandate for price stability, but none 
of the specifications seems to fulfill the Taylor principle. Like in the Table 1, if we follow the 
precept of the Taylor principle, it can be inferred that, the general small or no reaction to 
inflation gap might indicate a destabilizing behavior of the ECB (which is not realistic 
considering the ECB’s mandate). However, looking from other perspective, the small or no 
reaction to inflation gap might indicate the ECB’s success in anchoring inflation expectations, 
which caused inflation to be stable with small or insufficient variation regarding its target
4
. In 
fact, higher credibility of inflation targeting leads to less monetary policy response to changes in 
inflation (e.g., Peersman and Smets, 1999) 
                                                          
4
 see Annex B2  available on   https://www.dropbox.com/s/lz9qtw0ha5n7t73/AnnexB.pdf 
21 
 
 The relatively small magnitude in both inflation and output gap response coefficients 
may also be justified by the high degree of interest rate smoothing (ρ) and by the fact that the 
ECB considers a wide range of indicators of macroeconomic development other than inflation 
and output gap. 
 Concerning the policy rate response to its past values (ρ), it can be seen from the Table II 
that ρ is robust and remarkably high, a common feature found across the different forms of TRs 
as noticed in the Table I (e.g., Clarida el al, 1998; Faust el al, 2001; among others), which points 
that the actual policy rate depends more on its past values that it does on the fundamentals. This 
monetary policy inertia suggests that only 3 to 4 percent of change in the interest rate is reflected 
in the policy rate within the month of change and that the rest will be adjusted in the remaining 





 In fact, as depicted in the Fig.1, ECB follows interest-rate smoothing in its monetary 
policy: ECB interest rates slowly fell from 3 to 2.5 percent then raised gain to 3 percent during 
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percent throughout 2003 and then remained unchanged for more than two years, starting  
smoothly ascending until 2008 when the ECB began to lower interest rates in response to the 
critical economic conjecture. Most recently, the ECB has cut interest rate to historically low 
level (0.75 percent in July 2012).  
 No matter the interpretation of ρ, it does enhance the fit of TRs: as it is removed from the 
regression, TRs show a significant departure from the actual interest rate with reasonable 
serially correlated errors (Fig.2 right side). From Fig.2 (left side), it can be seen that TRs track 
the ECB actual policy rate very closely – feature robust to all measures of the output gap, 
independently of the estimator employed
5
. The major deviation of the actual policy rate from the 
TR can be found in the interval encompassing mid-1998, the outburst of the financial crisis 
(mid-2007) and the  ongoing Euro area sovereign debt crisis (mid-2009 – ). 
Figure 2 
 
 These deviations can be seen not as ECB departure from a systematic behavior but an 
evidence of the need of some level discretion (or flexibility) in the implementation of monetary 
policy. The deviations from the TR correspond to crisis episodes (that impaired monetary policy 
                                                          
5






1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
mdate
Eonia TR






1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
mdate
Eonia TR
Actual vs contrafactual policy rates, no smoothing 
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transmission channels) to which the ECB responded through non-standard measures (ECB, 2011, 
p.126-128).   
 The remarkably high adjusted R
2
 confirms the feature observed in the Fig.2, showing 
that, under the specifications used and regardless of output gap measures, TRs fit the actual data 
pretty well(except during economic turbulence period).  
 In terms of preferred specification, the information criteria the Akaike’s (AIC) and 
Schwarz's Bayesian (BIC) information criteria appear to reward the model in which the annual 
growth of the IP index is used as measure of the output gap. Intuitively, the annual growth of the 
IP index is not subjected to estimation uncertainty as the other two measures do, and hence, 
appears to be less misleading. Although the use of CLI produces better results regarding policy 
response to inflation, the model displays higher AIC. Therefore, in the rest of the paper the 
estimations will be based on the output gap measured by annual growth of the industrial 
production (IP) index.  
4.2 Cross-checking different sample periods 
 In this section, the sample used covers the period which correspond to launch of euro 
area (January 1999) up to December 2011. The objective is to observe whether the use of 
unchained data displays major differences as compared to the chained pre-EMU and post-EMU 
data used so far (the estimation results are available in the Annex A8). 
 We observed a slight increase in the magnitude of the inflation response coefficient (βπ), 
a decrease in magnitude and statistical significance of the output gap response coefficient (βx), 
which asserts the ECB’s overriding mandate for price stability; and a slight decrease in the AIC 
and BIC. However, the results are not so far apart compared to the ones on the Table II, which 
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may tell us that though the ECB is more anti-inflationary than individual central banks of the 
EMU member states, the national central banks cooperation and monetary policy coordination in 
the pre-EMU was indeed aimed at low inflation. 
 The βπ still does not exceed the value embodied in the Taylor principle. When the 
expected realized output gap is removed from the TR (but included in the instruments set for 
inflation in the GMM estimator, as to reflect the ECB monetary policy mandate which does not 
respond directly to economic activity, but to its effects on inflation), βπ becomes statistically 
very significant but still does not exceed a unit (results available in the Annex A9).  
4.3 Change in the Economic Structure 
 Here we analyze the impact of the changes in the economic structure associated with the 
introduction of the single currency in 1999, the two more recent and severe financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, namely, the outbreak of the subprime crisis (August 2007) and the 
European sovereign debt crisis (November 2009), by considering dummy variables. In addition, 
given the results obtained, we also cross-check the TRs performance during subprime crisis 
period (2007:8-2009:06) and in the absence of it (by removing crisis period of time from the 
sample).  
 The dummies were set such that it takes on value 0 prior and 1 after January 1999, 
August 2007, and November 2009, respectively. The equation is depicted as follows: 
(7)   it
 
 =  α + δD + βπ(πt+6 - π  )+βxxt + ρit-1  + εt   ,  where D stands for dummies.  
  The results concerning the inclusion of the dummies are reported in the table III. With 
regard to the introduction of the single currency in 1999, under the specifications being used, 
25 
 
apparently it did not triggered monetary policy response. This comes without surprise given the 
monetary convergence process (Maastricht Treaty or Criteria) that preceded the introduction of 
the single currency. This is in line with the results we obtained in the previous section. 
 As for the subprime crisis, the ECB appears to ignore it as the coefficient (dummy 2) 
shows up statistically insignificant, which may correspond to the fact that the ECB didn’t react 
aggressively to the subprime crisis at its outburst. This goes in line with Bouvet and King (2011), 
that found that August 2007 does not correspond to a structural break in the ECB policy (but 
December 2008, instead), given that the spillover effect of the US housing crisis on Europe 
started to feel severe only in the second half of 2008 (even though state interventions actuated 
offering liquidity to the banking system from the onset of the subprime crisis). 
TABLE III: ESTIMATES OF TR IN THE EURO AREA: 1994:01-2011:12 









1. it =  α + δD + βπ(πt+6 - π  )+βxxt + ρit-1  + εt   , estimated through GMM ; 
2. Standard errors in     parentheses (expect for the p-value). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001;  
3. Dummy1=0 prior and 1 after January 1999; Dummy2=0 prior and 1 after August 2007;and Dummy3= 0 prior and 1 
after November 2009;  
4. The output gap is measured as the annual growth in the industrial production index (%IP). 
Dummy 1 Dummy 2 Dummy 3






















α 0.0389 -0.00548 0.0426
(0.094) (0.045) (0.049)
j-test 1.974 2.639 0.83
(p-value) (0.3726) (0.2672) (0.6604)
N 198 198 198
adj. R




 In fact, it was not until October 2008 that the ECB Governing Council decided on 
interest rate cut by 50 basis points to 3.75 percent. The positive sign observed may be an 
indication of the increase in the policy rate carried out by the EBC in July 2008 on the basis of 
its assessment of risk to price stability.  
 Apparently the subprime crisis caused no change in the ECB’s behavior, so we cross-
checked this outcome by both removing the financial crisis period from our sample and also 
restraining the sample to the crisis period
6
. In the first case, the policy response to both inflation 
and output gap increases in magnitude and statistical significance. However, during the 
subprime crisis, while policy response to output gap remains slightly the same, the response to 
inflation is rather statistically lower and has even a negative value. This may indicate that during 
the subprime crisis the focus of the ECB was not on inflation itself (variations appear to be 
perceived as temporary by the ECB, because long term inflation expectations are well-anchored), 
which by the way has been above 2 percent, but rather on factors that threat price stability (e.g., 
the economic activity). Also the interest rate smoothing coefficient, ρ, shows that monetary 
policy is more inertial in the absence of the crisis. 
  We also removed the output gap from the TR when working with the subprime crisis 
sample (see footnote 6), and found that policy response to inflation, βπ, becomes very significant. 
This outcome reinforces the important role of the output gap as leading indicators for inflation 
pressure. 
 As for the sovereign debt crisis (dummy 3) the result is consistent with the ECB dealing 
with it at its outburst through cuts in the interest rate.  
                                                          
6
  See Annex B3  and Annex B4 available on https://www.dropbox.com/s/lz9qtw0ha5n7t73/AnnexB.pdf 
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4.4 Impact of additional explanatory variables  
              As we have seen, the relatively small magnitude in both inflation and output gap 
response coefficients, may  also suggest that the ECB base its decision regarding the adjustment 
of the policy rate on a wide range of indicators of macroeconomic development, other than 
inflation and output gap. Therefore, following e.g., Clarida et al (1998), Gerlach and Schnabel 
(2000) among others, we extended the baseline regression by taking into account additional 
variables to widen the set of information to some extent. The regression is depicted as follows 
(for the estimation results see AnnexA10) 
(8) it =  α + βπ(πt+6 - π  )+βxxt + βγzt+ρit-1  + εt   
     where zt stands for additional explanatory variables such as federal funds rate; stock market 
barometers, namely, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx, the DJ corrected for the economic activity growth, 
and the interest rate spread measure as the difference between the Euro area 10-year 
Government bond yield and 3-month euribor; exchange rates, both Real effective (REER) and 
Nominal effective (NEER) measure as annual change rates; monetary aggregate (M3) gap 
measures as the deviation of M3 annual growth from the reference value (4½%) set by the ECB 
(see Annex A1). In addition, regarding the role sovereign risk played in departures of policy 
from the rule we included Greek and Portuguese risk premiums measured as the difference 
between 10-year bond yield (Greece, Portugal) and 10-year Germany Government (“risk-free”) 
bond yield.   
 The results we obtained suggest that the predictive ability of many variables for future 
inflation has weakened. Except for the US monetary policy (fed funds), to which the ECB policy 
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is very responsive, given the existing financial flows links (a result that is contrary to 
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004) but consistent with Ullrich (2003)), the additional variables 
considered, appear to provide statically no additional information to the ECB governing council. 
However, they seem to have some economic significance, as we expect ECB to react to, for 
instance, a rise in the DJ euro stoxx by raising the policy rate, while lowering the policy rate in 
response to hikes in the interest rate spread
7
. The sovereign risk premium (Greece, Portugal) is 
only statically significant from August 2007 (only when both risk premiums are included in the 
regression simultaneously). The latter results may be related to ECB’s non-standard measures 
and the intervention of “Troika”8. 
 The result (from AnnexA10: βγ (M3)= -0.003) suggests that, though the M3 plays an 
important role as a leading warning indicator of threats to price stability in medium to long term 
in the ECB monetary analysis, under the specification used (output gap measured by the annual 
growth in the IP index) the ECB policy rate is unresponsive to M3. This outcome is not 
uncommon in the TRs literature as e.g., Gorter et al (2008) and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) 
testifies. Also, this negative coefficient confirms the conclusions of Ullrich (2003), by which the 
ECB follows a counterintuitive action regarding M3 growth, because, theoretically, we expect 
interest rate hikes in response to “harmful” money growth. Nevertheless, it does not imply that 
the growth of the M3 should be disregarded. As a matter of fact, monetary policy does not react 
mechanically to deviations of M3 growth from the reference value
9
 . 
                                                          
7
 See Annex B5 on https://www.dropbox.com/s/lz9qtw0ha5n7t73/AnnexB.pdf 
8
 The committee led by the European Commission(EC) with the ECB  and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
that organize  and monitor loans to the governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
9
 ECB Monetary policy glossary available on http://www.ecb.int/home/glossary/html/act4m.en.html. 
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 In general, the output gap and inflation gap coefficient response, (βx) and (βπ) 
respectively, continues to point out to the ECB’s overriding goal - price stability.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation analyzes the capability of Taylor rules in tracking the ECB behavior 
from 1994:01 to 2011:12. Three different measures of output gap were employed and the TRs 
were estimated through GMM, following a simple forward-looking approach. The impact of the 
change in the economic structure associated to the launch of the euro, the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on the course of the ECB’s 
policy-making were also analyzed. And finally, the TR was extended to consider the impact of 
additional explainable variables other than inflation and output gap. 
 It was found that policy rates response to either inflation or output gap is very sensitive 
to the output gap measure and estimation method: The standard Hodrick-Prescott output gap 
points to a prominent role of the output gap in the monetary transmission mechanism, which is 
consistent with the fact that economic growth is an indicator of risk to price stability. Contrary, 
when the economic activity measured by the annual growth rate of the industrial production (IP) 
index or by the annual growth rate of the composite leading indicator (CLIs), the general result 
suggests the ECB not only adjust the policy rate in response to inflation but also to the economic 
activity, even though their response coefficient are relatively small in magnitude. 
 Although the use of CLI (which components exhibit leading relationship with IP index at 
turning points) as proxy for the economic activity produces better result regarding the policy 
rate response to inflation gap, the model is penalized with higher Akaike’s (AIC) and Schwarz's 
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Bayesian (BIC) information criteria. 
The empirical results also point to ECB unresponsiveness to the launch of the euro 
(January 1999) and to the subprime crisis at its outburst (August 2007). However, the sovereign 
debt crisis seemed to trigger an immediate response from the ECB. Results which are roughly 
consistent with observed ECB’s behavior. 
With regard to the additional variables, our analysis suggests that the predictive ability of 
money and many other variables for inflationary pressure has weakened in recent years, 
showing no statistical significance. 
 We could see that, although simple, TRs seem to track the ECB policy decision very 
closely with major deviations occurring during the crises episodes. This close track is mainly 
caused by the gradualism of ECB monetary policy (attested by the high and robust degree of 
interest rate smoothing) and its systematic behavior. In fact, the outcome obtained points that the 
actual short-interest rate is heavily dependent on its own past values (fact which confirm the 
important role of credibility in the monetary policy). Despite of the close track, TRs may have 
little to say regarding all relevant information underlying the decision-making of the ECB.  
 For instance, none of the specifications employed fulfilled the Taylor principle and, in 
general, the coefficients obtained in our empirical results are quite small in magnitude. This may 
either be an evidence of a destabilizing behavior (according to the Taylor principle) of the ECB 
or of the ECB´s effort (through its two-pillar monetary policy strategy) to anchor inflation 
expectations which caused inflation to be stable with small variation regarding its target. Given 
the ECB’s anti-inflationary philosophy, it may be inferred that TRs or, more specifically, the 
Taylor principle is not in harmony with the reality of the actual ECB. This outcome calls for 
further and deepest research. 
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 Because TRs are superficial representation of a complex reality, it does not cover all 
relevant information underlying the decision-making of the ECB. Nevertheless, due to it nature, 
TRs may still be used as an additional informative indicator. 
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VII. ANNEX 
Annex A 
Annex A1:  Description of the variables and respective sources. 
The ex-post data used in this exercise comprises monthly data covering the sample period 
1994:01 to 2011:12, and refers to the Euro area - changing composition*. All the series are 
seasonally adjusted. 









The policy rate is represented by Eonia, the euro 
overnight index average; the rate at which banks 
borrow from each other is one of the benchmark 
interest rates for the money and capital markets. It 
is computed as a weighted average of all overnight 
unsecured lending transactions from banks 












“Consumer price inflation in the Euro area is 
measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP). The HICP is compiled by Eurostat 
and the national statistical institutes in accordance 
with harmonised statistical methods”10 (ECB). 
The euro area HICP is constructed by taking a 
weighted average of price indices of EMU member 
states. 











Computed by subtracting the inflation rate of the 
ECB from the inflation target, which, by definition 
of the ECB price stability, is less but close to 2% 
over the  medium term. 






The overall industrial production index is a 
business cycle indicator which measures monthly 
changes in the price-adjusted output of industry. 
The IP used here covers the total industry which 
comprises the production in mining, manufacturing 
and public utilities (electricity, gas and water) and 












in IP  (βx) 
 Measured by taking the annual percentage change 
in the IP index 
 %IP= 100*log (IPt/IPt-12) # # 
HP filter 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a data smoothing 
method that was first used by Robert J. 
Hodrick and Edward C. Prescott in 1997. This 
method removes the short-term trends or 
fluctuations from the data, which gives us a long-
term feature of the data. Assuming that the xt the  
original series is composed of a cyclical component 
( ct)   and  a trend component  (gt).                                                                    
  Where cyclical component (ct) = original time 
series (xt) - growth or trend component (gt). The 
parameter λ (λ≥0) penalizes variability in the  gt 
series. The larger the λ, the smoother is the solution 
series. λ takes on values 100 for annual series, 1600 
for quarterly series and 14.400 for monthly series 
Min (       ct )








The difference between the IP index and its HP 
trend. 
xt = (yt  -  yt*)  = 
100*(log(IP)- HP(log(IP)) 






The OECD created a composite leading indicator- 
which differs from GDP and output gap 
projections- that could be able not only to reveal 
early signs of economic turning-points, but also 
move in the same direction as the business cycle. 
Therefore, the selected indicators comprise 
 CLIAAt= (CLINormt-


















macroeconomic indicators that follow the business 
cycle. The CLI is optimized to detect turning 
points, not the levels of the industrial production 
(IP) index reference series. 
In this exercise, it was considered the CLI 
amplitude adjusted, because accordingly to the 
OECD, this method is the most straightforward and 
provides an interpretation in line with the output 
gap.11 
A word of cautious from the OECD is that CLIs 
should not be interpreted as providing exact 
forecasts. Furthermore, results provided by CLIs 
are qualitative rather than quantitative information 
on short-term economic movements. 
  
  
Additional explanatory variables (βγ) 
Federal 
funds rate  
This is the interest rate on US banks overnight 
loans. 
It is a benchmark rate and a barometer of credit 
market condition and the monetary policy stance of 





















price index  DJ Euro Stoxx is a stock index of Eurozone stocks.   












m )  
  (13/06/  20
12) 
 Annual rate 
of change in 
the DJ Euro 
Stoxx 50 
price index  







Also a market barometer considered is the interest 
rate spread measured as the difference between the 
Euro area 10-year Government Benchmark bond 
yield and 3-month euribor. 
It is a simple but useful indicator of market stress or 
recession.  In one hand, the as investors fear a 
coming recession, they short their short-term 
securities in exchange for long-term securities; this 
will cause the spread to be negative.  By the other 
hand, the hike of interest rate spread signals rising 
risk within the capital market for long-term credits 
which drive investment decisions. 
Euro area 10-year Government 
Benchmark bond yield minus 3-
month euribor  
FM.M.U2.EU
R.4F.BB.U2_1
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GR and PT 
risk 
premium 
Refers to a proxy of sovereign risk or risk premium for 
Greece and Portugal.  
10-year government bond 
(Greece, Portugal) minus 10-





















CPI deflated referring to the Euro area-17 countries 
vis-a-vis the EER-20 group of trading partners (AU, 
CA, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR, SE, CH, GB, US, 
















Index                                
Monetary aggregates are measures of money supply 
commonly defined by central banks. They range 
from M1 to M3 and differ according to the degree 
of liquidity of the assets included thereof13.     
M3= M2+ Repurchase 
agreements+ Money market 
fund (MMF) shares/units + 















s(ECB)       
( 13/07/20
12)  
    
2005=100 
M3 Gap 
  The ECB Governing Council set a reference value 
for M3 which refers to the annual growth rate of 
M3, namely an annual growth rate of 4½%, and is 
considered to be consistent with the ECB monetary 
goal and serves as a benchmark to assess monetary 
developments. According to the ECB this value is 





Measured by taking the annual percentage change in 
the M3  index 
log (M3t/M3t-12)*100 
*Euro area changing composition:  
 Euro11: January 1999 - Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain; 
 Euro12: January 2001 – Greece; 
 Euro 13: January 2007 –Slovenia; 
 Euro 15 : January 2008 – Cyprus and Malta; 
 Euro 16 : January 2009 –Slovakia; 
 Euro 17: January 2011– Estonia. 







Annex A2: Summary statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Eonia (rt*) 216 3.23 1.64 .34 6.84 
Inflation rate (πt) 216 2.021 .745 -.614 4.087 
OECD Composite Leading Indicators (CLIs) (xt) 216 1.001 1.14 96.07 101.963 
Annual growth CLIs (xt) 216 .159 1.74 -5.11 4.37 
Industrial production Index (IP) (xt) 216 9.44 7.34 80.22 110.09 
Growth rate in the IP 216 1.15 4.84 -20.82 7.66 
Standard  HP output gap 216 .0007 .0241 -.0950 .066 
Fed funds rate 216 3.39 2.16 .07 6.54 
Annual growth in the DJ Euro stoxx 50 price index 216 7.30 23.86 -45.12 59.12 
DJCorr1 216 .022 27.41 -78.62 60.38 
REER 216 -.487 6.02 -12.42 11.67 
NEER 216 -.935 6.02 -12.31 12.55 
grM3 216 5.89 2.87 -1.032 12.53 
grM3_gap 216 1.39 2.87 -5.53 8.035 
Note: REER and NEER refer to their respective annual growths; grM3 refers to annual growth rate of the monetary 
aggregate (M3); grM3_gap refers to the difference between the annual growth of the monetary aggregate (M3) and 
the reference value (4½%) set by the ECB. 
Annex A3: Tests for Stationarity 
  
DF-GLS Statistic                                         
 (5 % critical value) 
KPSS-Statistic:                                                     
5 % critical value = 0.146  
Series   Level First differences  Level First differences 
Eonia (rt*) 
  -1.582                     
(-2.924  )   
  -7.166                       
( -2.925) 
0.256 0.0864 
Inflation rate (πt) 
 -2.368                            
( -2.924 ) 
-7.840                       
(  -2.925 )  
0.169 0.0398 
OECD CLIs 
 -12.067                   
( -2.924 )    
  -8.979                              
( -2.925)    
0.0984 0.0522 
Annual growth CLIs 
(xt) 
-14.709                     
(  -2.924  ) 
-8.954                              
(  -2.925 ) 
0.104 0.0505 
Growth rate in IP (xt) 
-2.156                       
(-2.924  ) 
  -7.106                     
(  -2.925  ) 
0.102 0.0352 
Standard HP output gap 
(xt) 
  -2.540                     
(-2.924 ) 
-9.346                           
(-2.925  ) 
0.071 0.033 
Fed funds rate 
  -1.410                     
( -2.924)   
   -4.763                      
(-2.925 )   
0.246 0.145 
Annual growth in the 
DJ Euro stoxx 50 price 
index 
 -2.870                      
(-2.924 ) 
   -7.587                       
( -2.925 ) 0.168 0.0378 
DJ Correction    -3.191                      -7.935                            0.143 0.0354 
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( -2.924  ) ( -2.925  ) 
REER 
   -3.679                        
(-2.924  )  
-9.780                         
( -2.925  ) 
0.174 0.0267 
NEER 
-3.799                       
( -2.924  ) 
 -9.771                        
( -2.925)  
0.175 0.0243 
grM3_gap 
-1.977                            
( -2.924 ) 
-7.352                        
(-2.925 ) 
0.589 0.0957 
 Note:  
1. DF-GLS refers to the Elliott et al (1996) efficient test for an autoregressive unit root similar to an (augmented) 
Dickey-Fuller "t" test, as but has the best overall performance in terms of small sample size and power. DF-GLS 
hypothesis: H0 is a unit root, HA is stationarity. 
2. KPSS refers to the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, Shin test for stationarity of a time series. This test differs 
from those in common use by having a null hypothesis of stationarity. This test is complementary to other tests 
such as DF-GLS, Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron; being often used in conjunction with those tests to 
investigate the possibility that a series is neither I (1) nor I (0). KPSS test hypothesis: H0 is stationarity, H1 is a 
unit root. 
3. Fed funds rate becomes stationary only after the third differentiation (KPSS test statistic: 0.0174); For the KPSS 
test the maximum lag order was chosen automatically (maxlag=3); and for the DF-GLS the maximum lag order 
chosen is one (maxlag= 1). 
Annex A4: Endogeneity test 
  
Sargan-Hansen statistics                                                                                     
  ( Chi-sq(1) P-value) 
variables \output gap measures HP output gap %IP CLI 
Inflation (gap) 
0.853 3.076 3.444 
(0.3556) (0.0795) (0.0635) 
output (gap) 
0.684 0.338 3.913 
(0.4084) (0.5612) (0.0479) 
Note: Endogeneity tests employed was implemented by STATA after ivreg2, which is similar to C statistics defined as 
the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics:  one for the equation with the smaller set of instruments, where the 
suspect regressor(s) are treated as endogenous, and one for the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the 
suspect regressors are treated as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis (H0) the specified endogenous regressor(s) 
can actually be treated as exogenous, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of regressors tested. Under conditional homoskedasticity, this endogeneity test statistic is numerically equal 
to a Hausman test statistic. 
Annex A5: Tests for heteroskedasticity  
 t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value
 Pagan-Hall general   16.797 0.0049 22.045 0.0005 20.418 0.0010
 Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality 27.208 0.0001 37.223 0.0000 39.711 0.0000
White/Koenker nR2 17.545 0.0036 23.151 0.0003 21.882 0.0006
 Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg 29.096 0.0000 39.062 0.0000 47.009 0.0000
HP output gap IP% CLI




Note: these are standard tests designed to detect any linear form of heteroscedasticity. Under the null hypothesis the 
error variances are all equal.  
 
Annex A6: Serial correlation test  
                  Test\ outputgap measure IP% 
  t-statistic  p-value 
Cumby-Huizinga test 0.12059892 0.728386 
Note: H0: errors non-autocorrelated at order 1; Cumby-Huizinga test is “especially attractive because it can be used 
in three frequently encountered cases where alternative such as the Box-Pierce test, Durbin's h test and the 
Breusch-Godfrey test are not applicable. One of these cases is the presence of endogenous regressors, which 
renders each of these tests invalid. A second case involves the overlapping data commonly encountered in financial 
markets where the observation interval is shorter than the holding period, which requires the estimation of the 
induced moving average (MA) process. The Cumby-Huizinga test avoids estimation of the MA process by utilizing 
only the sample autocorrelations of the residuals and a consistent estimate of their asymptotic covariance matrix. 
The third case involves conditional heteroskedasticity of the regression error term, which is also handled without 
difficulty by the Cumby-Huizinga test”
14
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Annex A7: CROSS-CHECKED RESULTS; ESTIMANTES OF TR IN THE EURO AREA -1994:01-
2011:12 – OTHER ESTIMATORS. 
 
Note: 
1. it =  α + βπ (πt+6 - π  )+ βxxt+3 + ρit-1 +εt 
2. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
3. AIC and BIC stands for the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, respectively-the lower their value , the  better the 
model; RMSE stands for root mean square error which measures the dispersion  in the error term.  
4. Standard HP output gap stands for t the difference between the logarithm of the annual growth IP index and its HP 
trend; %IP stands for the annual growth rate of the Industrial production index; and CLI for the annual growth rate of the 
amplitude adjusted composite leading indicator (CLIs) of the OCDE.  
6. The j-test stands for the Sargan-Hansen test, a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid instruments (uncorrelated with the error term). The J statistic is consistent in the presence of 









βπ -0.0016 0.0311 0.057
** 0.052 0.0792* 0.106***





(0.748) (0.003) (0.010) (1.267) (0.0034 (0.009)
ρ 0.969*** 0.979*** 0.985*** 0.978*** 0.989*** 0.987***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
α 0.0733* 0.0225 0.016 0.051 0.0042 0.0151
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
N 209 209 209 198 198 204
j-test 8.544 0.331 4.463
(p-value) (0.014) (0.847) (0.107)
AIC -117 -123 -110 -132 -144 -115
BIC -103 -110 -96.92 -119 -131 -102
RMSE 0.181 0.177 0.182 0.170 0.165 0.179






Annex A8: CROSS-CHECKED RESULTS; ESTIMANTES OF TR IN THE EURO AREA -1999:01-
2011:12 – DIFFERENT SAMPLE. 
  
 Note: See note on Annex A7; except that the output gap is measured by the annual growth rate in the industrial production     
index (%IP).  
 
Annex A9: CROSS-CHECKED RESULTS; ESTIMANTES OF TR IN THE EURO AREA -1994:01-








































































(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
α 0.0456








(0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
N 209 204 204 204 204 204 204
j-test 3.853 5.611 5.784 5.922 8.506 8.805
(p-value) (0.146) (0.061) (0.056) (0.052) (0.014) (0.012)
AIC -93 -98 -86 -91 -89 -78 -84
BIC -83 -88 -76 -81 -79 -68 -74
RMSE 0.191 0.188 0.193 0.191 0.192 0.197 0.194





2. When implementing the GMM and LMIL ,  the output gap is included in the set of instrumental variables to reflect the 
ECB monetary policy overriding mandate which does not respond directly to economic activity, but its effects on inflation 
 




1. it =  α + βπ(πt+6 - π  )+βxXt + βγZt+ρit-1  + εt   , 
2. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; 
3. The output gap measure implemented  refers to the annual growth in the industrial production index; 
4. The DJ Corr. refers to the difference between the annual changes in the DJ Euro Stoxx 50 and  the annual change in the 
IP index, which allow to  measure the growth in the stock prices not explained by real growth; 
5. The exchange rates, both Real effective (REER) and Nominal effective (NEER), are measure as annual change rates; 
grM3 refers to annual growth rate of the monetary aggregate (M3); grM3_gap refers to the difference between the annual 
growth of the monetary aggregate (M3) and the reference value (4½%) set by the ECB; interest rate spread refers to the 
difference between the Euro area 10-year Government bond yield and 3-month euribor; 
6. GR and PT risk premium refers to a proxy of sovereign risk of Greece and Portugal measured by the difference between 
10-year government bond (Greece, Portugal) and 10-year government bond (Germany).When considering the inclusion of 
sovereign risk, the sample period ranges from August 2007 to December 2011. The risk premium is only significant from 





the DJ Euro 
stoxx 50 
index


















(0.034) (0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) -0.0214 (0.058) (0.069)








(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
βγ 0.0445























(0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.028) (0.032)
α 0.025 0.002 0.007 0.018 0.019 0.005 0.030 0.032 0.043
(0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.028) (0.051) (0.057) (0.065)
j-test 2.945 3.322 2.217 1.894 1.878 3.087 1.732 0.4569 1.567
(p-value) (0.229) (0.190) (0.330) (0.388) (0.391) (0.214) (0.421) (0.345) (0.457)
N 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 47 47
adj. R









GR and PT risk 
premium
47
-0.0103
(0.041)
0.0216
***
(0.006)
